

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**RETOOLING THEATER STRATEGIC-LEVEL FORCE PROTECTION
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

by

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ABSTRACT

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General Wayne A. Downing's (USA, Ret) report, dated 30 August 1996, on the bombing of Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, is widely held within the force protection community as the initial "forcing function" for integrating force protection into Department of Defense planning and operations. While a great deal of work on force protection has been accomplished since then, the effort, to a large extent, appears to be focused at the operational and tactical levels. A review of current doctrine leaves one unclear as to the construct for, and execution of, force protection at the theater strategic-level. This work examines current and emerging doctrine on force protection at the theater strategic-level and reviews the future operational environment for the 21st century. From there, the author proposes a construct for theater strategic-level force protection for the 21st century.

RETOOLING THEATER STRATEGIC-LEVEL FORCE PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

General Wayne A. Downing's (USA, Ret) report, dated 30 August 1996, on the bombing of Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, is widely held within the force protection community as the initial "forcing function" for integrating force protection into Department of Defense planning and operations. While a great deal of work on force protection has been accomplished since then, the effort, to a large extent, appears to be focused at the operational and tactical levels. A review of current doctrine leaves one unclear as to the construct for, and execution of, force protection at the theater strategic-level.

The future operational environment will continue to evolve; however, pieces of the picture are emerging. The majority of future operations will most likely be coalition efforts, not U.S. only operations. We may not be the lead organization in all of these operations. Our adversaries will be very adaptive and innovative; they will not fight by our understanding of the "rules of warfare." Future operating environments will have numerous actors on the playing field; some with noble intentions and others with not-so-noble intentions. The future operating environment will consist of multiple "operating domains" within which our adversaries and numerous other actors will execute their objectives. It is within this context that we will review the current composition of theater strategic-level force protection.

This work examines current and emerging doctrine on force protection at the theater strategic-level and reviews the future operational environment for the 21st century. From there, a construct for theater strategic-level force protection for the 21st century will be proposed.

Current Doctrine

To begin, we will review Department of Defense Joint Capstone and Keystone publications that pertain to force protection. We will look at force protection definitions, authorities, and tasks at the theater strategic-level.

The current Department of Defense definition for force protection is: "preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease."¹ This definition concludes with a note to see "protection".

The recently released Joint Operations manual establishes six joint functions: command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment. Joint functions are a set of capabilities, which together, help the Joint Force Commander "integrate,

synchronize, and direct joint operations.”² The protection function is defined as the: “preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area.”³

Before moving on, we need to address the Department of Defense Antiterrorism Program as outlined in the current *Department of Defense Directive 2000.12*. There are those who believe that this document is the Force Protection Directive within the Department of Defense. The 18 August 2003 publication changed the name of the program from the Department of Defense Antiterrorism / Force Protection Program to the Department of Defense Antiterrorism Program. The current directive identifies the Department of Defense Antiterrorism program as “one of several security-related programs that fall under the overarching Combating Terrorism and Force Protection programs.”⁴

The *Unified Command Plan*, which delineates both missions and responsibilities for Commanders of Combatant Commands, addresses the following responsibilities as they pertain to force protection: “the combatant commander is responsible for ...maintaining the security of and carrying out force protection responsibilities for the command, including assigned or attached commands, forces, and assets.”⁵ In addition, “the geographic combatant commander is additionally responsible, within the commander’s geographic AOR,⁶ for... exercising force protection responsibilities for all US military forces (except DOD personnel for who the chiefs of US diplomatic missions have security responsibilities by law or interagency agreement).”⁷

The *Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer* identifies force protection as one of five major considerations for combat for the Joint Force Commander. The Joint Force Commander conserves the fighting potential of the joint force by protecting his force, ensuring safety and minimizing fratricide.⁸

Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, identifies force protection as essential for U.S. forces, people, families, and facilities worldwide. It includes protecting military capabilities and functions that are essential for mission accomplishment. Considerations for force protection include military units within the joint operational area and military and civilian high value personnel, wherever they may be located, to include within the United States. While force protection is not recognized as a stand alone mission, it is an essential consideration across the range of military operations.⁹

Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, states “The protection function focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential...”¹⁰ The protection function is accomplished

through: "...active defensive measures...passive defensive measures...applying technology and procedures...and emergency management and response..."¹¹ In addition, the protection function may extend beyond the protecting of U.S. Department of Defense assets and include the "protection of US noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and other governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations."¹² The protection function includes the following tasks:

Providing air, space, and missile defense; protecting noncombatants; providing physical security for forces and means; conducting defensive countermeasure operations, including counter-deception and counterpropaganda operations; providing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense; conducting OPSEC, computer network defense (CND), IA, and electronic protection activities; securing and protecting flanks, bases, base clusters, JSAs, and LOCs; conducting PR operations; conducting chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) CM; conducting antiterrorism operations; establishing capabilities and measures to prevent fratricide; provide emergency management and response capabilities and services.¹³

Force protection is identified within the protection function as "preventive measure taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel, resources, facilities and critical information." Again, force protection applies to Department of Defense personnel only. The definition goes on to state that "force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the air, land, maritime, and space domains and information environment across the range of military operations..."¹⁴

Although not a capstone publication, Joint Publication 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, merits a brief mention. As a joint tactics, techniques and procedures publication, this manual sets the frame-work for joint security operations. Joint security operations are defined as providing: "...for the defense of and facilitate force protection (FP) actions for designated bases, base clusters, LOCs, and other designated areas."¹⁵

The joint force commander bears overall responsibility for joint security operations and "establishes force protection measures, procedures, and policies" within his area of operation. In addition, the joint force commander apportions and dedicates assets for joint security operations. In low threat environments, the joint force commander may retain control of joint security operations through his J3 (Joint Force Operations Directorate); however, in high-threat environments he normally designates a subordinate joint force commander as the joint security coordinator. Subordinate joint force commanders are responsible for providing security for all military bases and lines of communications within their operational area.¹⁶

Joint security operations planning considerations include: force protection; intelligence; communications; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives; integrated air defense; early warning and alert; coastal warfare; terrain management; infrastructure development; security for area damage control; integration of joint security and logistics operations; and detainee operations.¹⁷

Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*, includes force protection as an integral part of the joint planning process. Force protection is one of several functional staff estimates conducted in support of the course of action selection process.¹⁸ The focus of force protection planning efforts is derived from the identification of friendly force strategic and operational centers of gravities.¹⁹

A review of current and emerging U.S. joint doctrine makes it clear that current and emerging doctrine contains obvious disconnects when it comes to force protection. There are two doctrinal terms, force protection and protection, which appear to share similar tasks and objectives. There is a noticeable distinction in how each of these “protection” missions is to be accomplished: the first through mitigating threats to force capabilities and the second through preserving force capabilities. Both end-states accomplish the same thing – protection of the force. Last, and perhaps most important, the theater strategic-level force protection task seem ambiguous. An in-depth review will be synopsized further in this paper. Before we proceed, however, it is important to understand the future operational environment necessary to place 21st century theater strategic-level protection into context.

Future Operational Environment

Throughout warfare, one fact remains constant: all wars are different because adversaries learn from their mistakes and the mistakes of others – adversaries adapting to each others’ tactics, techniques and procedures is the nature of war.²⁰ Current and future strategic environments continue to support history. “The predominant feature of the future strategic and operational environment is complexity---complexity in environments, complexity in enemy forces, and complexity in friendly operations.”²¹ Future operations will be long in duration, complex, involving numerous U.S. and coalition partners, and conducted simultaneously throughout a number of theaters.²²

The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America makes it clear that uncertainty will be the “defining characteristic” of the strategic environment. Adversaries will not attack our strengths using “traditional” military action, but will “adopt asymmetric capabilities”.²³ They will employ an “array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities and

methods...”²⁴ Traditional capabilities include employment of regular, well-understood forms of military conflict. Irregular capabilities are the employment of unconventional means to counter traditional advantages. Catastrophic capabilities involve the procurement and use of weapons of mass destruction. Disruptive capabilities involve the use of break-through technologies to minimize our advantages.²⁵ Complexity and uncertainty will be universal characteristics throughout the future operating environment.

Our adversaries may employ any number of the above capabilities against us as they seek to exploit our vulnerabilities. They may seek to attack vulnerabilities within our battlefield capabilities such as: command and control or intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems or pursue our relationships with host nations, supporting nations, the media, commercial interests, and multinational or interagency partners. Our adversaries will take “maximum advantage” of the information, human and physical terrain in future conflicts.²⁶

Future operations conducted throughout the range of military operations will most likely include multiple actors. Although our adversaries may be the predominant opponent, other actors will no doubt come into play. Globalization and technological advancements may very well allow a number of these actors to operate anywhere in the world and still influence operations conducted within the joint operational environment. Some of these actors will be adversarial in nature (primary or supporting), or they may simply take advantage of the situation to further their own causes. These actors may include nation states, terrorists, insurgents, paramilitary organizations, narco-terrorists, international criminal organizations, or individuals.²⁷ Others actors may not be adversarial in nature; however, their actions, through second and third order effects, may enable our adversaries. These actors may include, but are not limited to: U.S. governmental agencies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental agencies, regional organizations,²⁸ international criminal organizations, international corporations, independent actors, global citizens, the media and nation states supporting our adversaries.

There are approximately 250 intergovernmental organizations operating throughout the world. These organizations include, as an example, the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and The European Union.²⁹ Intergovernmental organizations may be regionally or internationally focused and their objectives may very well be at odds with that of the United States Government.

International criminal organizations may choose to exploit opportunities by operating in countries where the host nation government has limited ability to disrupt their activities. Furthermore, arms trafficking and illicit drugs “have been estimated to be the two most valuable commodities in international trade.”³⁰ There should be no doubt that these operations will be

guarded judiciously by their criminal operators. An example of the impacts these organizations can have in the joint operational environment is evident in General Jones' statement that "violence in Afghanistan is more than just the Taliban...It comes from the drug cartels...It comes from crime and corruption."³¹

There are approximately 60,000 major international corporations operating throughout the world, such as Shell, Microsoft, Ford, Coca Cola, just to name a few.³² It may be impossible for most, if not all, countries to prevent the movement of business information and people across the globe. Many nations may have at least a limited ability to prevent direct trade between nations; however, most will find it very difficult to prevent indirect trade. During the British War in the Falklands, when both Argentina and Britain moved to block economic transactions, to include direct air connections, transnational companies simply shifted to other foreign branches of their corporations to maneuver around the restrictions.³³ The globalization of business has led to a worldwide dispersal of production phases through local, national, regional and global markets.³⁴ This includes the defense industrial base, which has experienced numerous consolidations in the U.S. and European defense industries.³⁵ Critical military equipment and supplies may only be made by a few companies; however, pieces and parts are very likely made by numerous sub-contractors throughout the world. Even equipment and supplies made primarily in the U.S. may draw raw materials from other nations. This puts our production at risk, both to governments that disagree with our operations, and to those adversaries who identify and target those critical resources necessary to the production process.

There are approximately 10,000 single-country and 5,800 international non-governmental organizations operating throughout the world.³⁶ These organizations will be present in most, if not all, future military operations. In fact, some of these organizations such as the Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services, and CARE were formed during, or immediately after, previous wars.³⁷ Although the majority of nongovernmental organizations do not operate in direct support of our adversaries' aims, second and third order effects of non-governmental organization activities may very well result in indirect support to our adversaries. Warring factions may demand payment in return for allowing nongovernmental organizations access to needy populations, or may simply steal non-governmental organization goods and supplies.³⁸ There are three different approaches that nongovernmental organizations use for dealing with the negative outcomes of their works. The first approach is the "mandate blinders" approach, wherein the organization is committed to its efforts and "eschew responsibility for its secondary or tertiary impacts."³⁹ The second approach of "aid on our terms only" has the organization pursuing its objectives; however, the organization monitors the effects of their efforts and assumes

responsibility for those effects. The organization does retain the right to make the final determination whether to continue or cease their efforts. The third approach, titled “Hippocratic oath”, the organization takes responsibilities for the impacts of their efforts and seeks to learn from mistakes.⁴⁰ There is the potential that a small number of non-governmental organization efforts may become disruptive to joint force goals and objectives. Before force protection mitigation efforts can be implemented, an understanding of how these organizations operate within the joint operational environment will be essential.

As globalization continues to empower individuals through the freedom of worldwide movement and network connectivity, we see the emergence of the “super-empowered individual,”⁴¹ the independent actor. These individuals are capable of acting on the world stage without corporate or government intervention. Examples of super-empowered individuals include Jody Williams, who built an international coalition of more than “1,000 human rights and arms control groups”, to achieve a worldwide (minus the U.S.) ban on landmines. Her weapon of choice - emails. On the other hand, Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing simply wanted to “strike a blow at America.”⁴²

The internet explosion has brought into play every day citizens and their “influence of civil society in the management of global change.”⁴³ “The growth of private action for the public good is a recent, massive, almost universal phenomenon.”⁴⁴ Global citizens are using information technology for “networking and soft coordination,” to express to the world their opposition to the war in Iraq.⁴⁵ These global citizens may very well influence future global leaders and decisions regarding future operations.

Our adversaries have and will continue to conduct information operations via all modes of communications, radio, print, television, and internet, throughout the range of military operations. “Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media age...”⁴⁶ Extremist groups have used this forum for years, even establishing “media relations committees” to enhance their message and achieve the desired effects. Our adversaries continue to improve their capabilities in all communications venues to gain an advantage.⁴⁷

We will continue to have nation states and/or rouge states that do not support our efforts and, in-turn, will work to defeat our efforts through indirect approaches. Iran, Syria, Libya and others are currently providing arms, training, and financing to Islamic militants in Somalia in an effort to challenge U.S. interests in East Africa.⁴⁸ There are numerous reports of Syria and Iran indirectly supporting our adversaries in Iraq. Proxy wars are not a new phenomenon.

It is inescapable that the future strategic operating environment will be complex and uncertain. This leads to the objective for this paper: clarifying the role of theater strategic-level

force protection and how it will enable the Joint Force Commander to accomplish the military mission in support of our national objectives.

Recommendations for Retooling Theater Strategic-Level Force Protection for the 21st Century

As this paper has hinted, current and emerging U.S. joint force protection doctrine is perplexing at best. Before offering a construct for theater strategic-level force protection, it is important to resolve the somewhat divergent terms “protection” and “force protection,” and to define force protection at the theater strategic-level.

The approved joint definitions of “protection” and “force protection” have further muddled the water when it comes to understanding the true meaning of force protection. The force protection definition encompasses measures to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel, resources, facilities and critical information. This does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. The “protection” definition preserves the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and non-military personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. This includes efforts to limit the impacts of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from impacting personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities, and active/passive defensive measures for space assets against adversaries.

Aside from the “play on words,” these definitions appear to have the same end-state: protection of personnel, resources, facilities and information. However, one definition uses the term “mitigate” while the other uses the term “preserve”. The obvious conclusion here is that one cannot “mitigate” without “preserving” and cannot “preserve” capabilities without “mitigation”. Herein is the problem: defining the line between preservation and mitigation. In addition, one term applies to DoD only, while the other may be extended beyond DoD when necessary. This might imply that the protection of U.S. military personnel would be handled differently than that of allied soldiers operating right by their side. The continued use of both “protection” and “force protection” will only lead to uncertainty as to what exactly delineates one from the other; therefore, for ease of understanding, this paper will use the term “protection”.

Having arrived at the term “protection,” we now need to look at what protection encompasses in order to arrive at a definition of protection. Through an analysis of the above reviewed joint capstone and keystone publications and the analysis of the future operational environment, the following “protection” requirements can be derived.

The joint force commander is responsible for carrying out protection responsibilities for his command (except Department of Defense personnel under the Chief of Mission) within his respective area of operations. This includes assigned and attached forces within his area of operation or those forces transiting his area of operation. He establishes overall protection measures, procedures, and policies within his area of operation and apportions and dedicates assets for joint security operations. Joint protection function tasks are coordinated by the Joint Force Security Coordinator (the Joint Force Commander's Director of Operations or a designated subordinate joint force component commander) and executed by the joint force component commands.

The joint force commander conserves the joint force potential through protecting the force, ensuring safety, and minimizing fratricide. This involves the protection of personnel (to include family members), equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure. It includes mitigation efforts and emergency management and response to accidents, natural disasters and health threats. Protection may extend to: US noncombatants; forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and other governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

The joint force commander protection function is an essential consideration throughout the entire range of military operations⁴⁹ and is executed in all six phases of military operations (shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, enable civil authorities).⁵⁰ In addition, the joint force commander must protect against the entire spectrum of threats, both direct and indirect. It is clear that we can no longer afford to have our protection efforts focused solely on "hostile" intent. We must expand the threat spectrum to include all threats, whether those threats are direct or indirect, intended or unintended.

Joint protection is accomplished through active and passive defensive measures and the implementation of technology and procedural applications to defeat or mitigate the threat; however, defensive measures alone will not protect the force. The protection function must include offensive actions or measures (both kinetic and non-kinetic), when required, to defeat adversarial or actor efforts that impact the joint force commander's ability to accomplish the overall mission.

Given the above review, this paper proposes a modern definition of protection as: the application of offensive and defensive (both kinetic and non-kinetic) measures, within all operational domains (air, land, sea, space, cyber), to defeat or mitigate adversarial or actor threats (traditional, irregular, catastrophic, disruptive, and natural), in order to protect joint force capabilities (personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure), to preserve the

joint force potential to prosecute the military instrument of national power in support of national objectives. Protection may extend beyond that of protecting U.S. Department of Defense assets and include the protection of: U.S. noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and other governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

Having arrived at a single term “protection” and provided a proposed definition, this paper next addresses how protection is performed at the theater strategic-level. We have established that the joint force commander overall is: responsible for protection; establishes protection measures, policies, procedures; and apportions forces and assets as necessary to accomplish protection within his area of operation. In addition, we have established that: protection is accomplished through joint security operations; is coordinated by the joint security coordinator (as appointed by the joint force commander); and executed by joint force component commanders within their respective areas of operation. With this baseline understanding, this paper now identifies the ends, ways, and means for theater strategic-level protection and presents a construct for its accomplishment.

The “ends” of theater strategic-level protection is to preserve the joint force potential to prosecute the military instrument of power in support of national objectives. The “ways” include shaping the theater strategic-level security environment, establishing policies and procedures and assessing vulnerabilities. The “means” is the use of U.S. and friendly national, regional, and international instruments of power. The remainder of this paper will focus on “shaping the theater strategic-level protection environment,” since establishing theater policies and procedures and assessing vulnerabilities are logical outcomes of the shaping process.

Now that we have identified the ends, ways, and means for theater strategic-level protection, a proposed model is offered. The model encompasses four steps: 1) identify friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity; 2) identify the adversary and potential actors; 3) identify operational domains within which adversaries and potential actors may operate; and 4) apply U.S. and friendly national, regional, and international instruments of power to defeat or mitigate adversarial or actor threats.

Figure 1. illustrates the proposed model. The left side of the model depicts the adversary, potential actors and the five operating domains they may execute operations within. The right center depicts five categories (political, economic, military, social, informational, infrastructure) wherein friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity may reside. The far right of the model depicts seven elements of power which may be employed at the tactical, operational or theater strategic-level to protect friendly centers of gravity. The bottom of the model depicts the

operational levels (tactical, operational, theater strategic) and the corresponding “protection” efforts at each level.




Figure 1. Theater Strategic-Level Protection Model

Before addressing the proposed protection model, it is important to understand that protection planning begins first and foremost with understanding the Commanders’ mission and intent. Therefore, it is paramount that protection planners become involved in the joint planning process from the beginning and that they remain involved. Protection efforts must be planned for all phases of military operations (shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, enable civil authorities) and throughout the entire range of military operations. Furthermore, protection planning does not end with the publication of a plan. As our adversaries continue to adapt to our protection tactics, techniques, and procedures, protection planners must continually refine friendly protection measures, policies and procedures. Protection planning must also be conducted during execution planning and should be accomplished in conjunction with current operations planning (J3, Current Operations), near term planning (J35, Future Operations), and long term planning (J5, Future Plans).⁵¹

The first step in theater strategic-level protection is to identify friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity. This provides the initial focus for theater strategic-level protection efforts. This is important because the Joint Force Commander’s ultimate objective is to accomplish the military mission in support of our national objective. Protection, although critical

to the accomplishment of the mission, should not impede efforts to accomplish the mission; it should however, enable mission accomplishment. In addition, protection efforts will remain, in all probability, an economy of force mission and, therefore, we must focus our theater strategic-level protection efforts on protecting our strategic and operational centers of gravity.

Friendly center of gravity determination is identified as one of the most important tasks the joint force commander's staff accomplishes in the operational design process.⁵² Centers of gravity are defined as a set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act. Strategic centers of gravity may include military forces, alliances, political and military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. Operational centers of gravity, although normally associated with the armed forces, may include other capabilities within the operational environment. Unless the national objective is adjusted, friendly strategic centers of gravity will normally remain the same throughout the campaign, while friendly operational centers of gravity will normally change in each phase of military operations.⁵³

Friendly center of gravity determination is accomplished during mission analysis, as part of the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and should be refined continually, as needed, throughout the execution planning process. Identification of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity, along with their corresponding critical capabilities and requirements, and ultimately their associated critical vulnerabilities, is the overall objective of the friendly center of gravity analysis process. Dr. Joe Strange, in his work *Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities*, states "it is also important to protect friendly critical capabilities and critical requirements to prevent the latter from becoming critical vulnerabilities."⁵⁴ Friendly centers of gravity should be articulated in paragraph 1.f.(1) in the joint operations plan format.⁵⁵ The accompanying protection planning factors, derived from friendly center of gravity analysis, which may impact a selected course of action, should be addressed in the protection functional staff estimate.⁵⁶ In order to focus center of gravity analysis, this construct offers six categories wherein center of gravity determination, mainly the identification of critical capabilities and critical requirements, may be focused: political, economic, military, social, information, and infrastructure.

Normally conducted simultaneously with center of gravity analysis, the second step is identification of adversaries and potential actors. The definition of an adversary is "a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged."⁵⁷ Identification of the adversary and a thorough understanding of his capabilities and intent is critical to planning effectively the protection of strategic and operational friendly

centers of gravity. “Knowing the enemy – everything that makes him tick (his national history, society, culture, and psychology, in addition to orders of battle statistics and other military data)...is the first principle of war ...”⁵⁸ David Buffaloe, in his work *Defining Asymmetric Warfare*, argues a true asymmetric enemy can use any tool (organized crime, terrorism, disease, protest, natural disaster) to help achieve his objective, and therefore, it is critical to distinguish between the “asymmetric enemy and that enemy’s tools”.⁵⁹ Adversaries may include: nation states, terrorists, insurgents, paramilitary organizations, narco-terrorists, international criminal organizations or individuals actors. Correctly identifying our adversary then opens the door to identifying and understanding other potential actors and enablers which may be operating in the joint operational environment.

Potential actors and enablers are those organizations or individuals that are external to the adversary’s control. This does not mean that the adversary will not seek to use or capitalize on the actions of the actors or enablers. These actors may be, either purposefully or unintentionally, supporting the adversary or they may simply be taking advantage of the opportunity to further their own cause. Non-adversarial actors may include, but are not limited to: intergovernmental organizations, international criminal organizations, international corporations, non-governmental organizations, independent actors, global citizens, the media, or national states supporting our adversary.

The next step is to identify the operational domains from which our adversary and potential actors may operate. This becomes critical as we determine what instruments of power to apply within the operational domain in order to shape the theater strategic-level protection environment. Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, identifies air, land, sea and space as operational domains. A cyber domain has been added to the model based on a reasonable belief that a future asymmetric adversary may very well conduct operations solely within the cyber environment. Cyberspace is currently defined within the Department of Defense as “the notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks.”⁶⁰ Cyber operations may be both kinetic (attacking the computer systems and information) and non-kinetic (processing information for decision making or influence). We know that our current adversaries are conducting, very successfully, information operations against us within the cyber domain. In “Proteus, Insights from 2020,” the intelligence community explored potential intelligence problems in 2020. Thinking of the internet in the future as a destination, rather than a processor of information, the future may entail an internet which is, in and of itself, “a universe parallel to the physical one.” There is an unknown potential for “digital life” to emerge. The asymmetric potential here, both good and bad, is boundless.⁶¹

Now that we have identified: 1) our friendly centers of gravity along with their corresponding critical capabilities and critical requirements that require protection; 2) the adversaries and potential actors operating within the joint operational environment and; 3) the operating domains within which our adversaries and potential actors will operate; we can now identify the instruments of power, which when coordinated and synchronized with the military instrument of power, will enable the Joint Force Commander to shape the theater strategic-level protection environment.

The National Military Strategy states “prevailing against adversaries includes integrating all instruments of national power within a campaign to set the conditions for an enduring victory.”⁶² Instruments of national power are defined as: diplomatic, informational, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement.⁶³ The proposition is that we should not only integrate instruments of U.S. national power to shape theater strategic-level protection in the joint operating environment, but also try and integrate and synchronize the use of friendly, non-U.S. national, regional and international instruments of power.

The following paragraph provides an example of the “tools” within each “instrument of power” that are available to shape the theater strategic-level protection environment. This is by no means an all inclusive list, nor does it imply that each of these “tools” will be acceptable, suitable or even feasible in any or all given situations. This list simply represents the genesis of dialogue with the reader concerning what may be available, either through U.S. interagency partners or non-U.S. national, regional or international partners, when shaping the theater strategic-level protection environment.

Tools that may be considered within each instrument of power include: 1) Diplomatic: representation, negotiation, advocacy, intimidation, coalition building, consensus building, and direct coordination with national, regional or international companies and organizations; 2) Information: public diplomacy, public affairs, diplomatic demarches, and military strategic communications; 3) Military: strikes, raids, blockades, presence, arms control, humanitarian assistance, security assistance, information operations, and military to military contacts; 4) Economic: trade sanctions, embargoes, foreign aid, technology controls and regulations; 5) Finance: international monetary fund, world bank, debt forgiveness, subsidies, and freeze/seizing monetary assets; 6) Intelligence: exchange of information, external training, covert/paramilitary activities; 7) Law Enforcement: treaty compliance, extradition, external training, and combined operations.⁶⁴

JP 3-08, *Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Non-Governmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*, lists numerous U.S., regional,

intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations,⁶⁵ which may be capable of providing the “tools” of instruments of power in support of theater strategic-level protection. As many of these agencies may be physically located within the joint operational environment, their efforts may support both operational and tactical level protection operations as well.

Theater strategic-level protection support from both U.S. and non-U.S. instruments of power should be identified by the Joint Force Commanders’ Protection Working Group, planned for and synchronized within the joint operations planning execution process, and coordinated with the Joint Interagency Coordination Group for implementation and action. Requests for both U.S. and non-U.S. interagency support for theater strategic-level protection should be documented within Annex V of the Joint Operations Plan. Where feasible and appropriate, representatives from both U.S. and non-U.S. instruments of power may become valued members of the joint force commanders’ Protection Working Group.

Conclusion

This paper has identified several areas within the theater strategic-level protection area about which the joint community needs to address. We must resolve the issue over the use of multiple terms and definitions regarding force “protection.” We need to define and document, within our joint doctrine, coherent responsibilities, authorities and tasks for conducting theater strategic-level protection. Finally, and most importantly, we must consider the need to change the future mind set of force “protection” from a passive/active defensive mindset, to a proactive offensive mindset in order to defeat or deter the effects of 21st century threats prior to them reaching their desired effects.

Complexity and uncertainty will characterize the future operational environment. Our operations will be long term and multinational in effort. As addressed in the review of the future operational environment, our adversaries will employ traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive capabilities and methods. We will face actors who are, in and of themselves, our adversaries. These include, but are not limited to, traditional nation-state militaries, terrorists, insurgents, paramilitary organizations, narco-terrorists, international criminal organizations, and individuals. In addition, we will face actors whose intentions may or may not be adversarial in nature; however, their very actions, either directly or indirectly, through second and third order effects, may enable our adversaries or impede our operations. These include, but are not limited to: nation states, intergovernmental organizations, international corporations, non-governmental organizations, independent actors, global citizens, and the media. We face a

future 21st century operating environment that will become more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous.

The ultimate intent of theater strategic-level protection is to preserve the joint force potential in order to prosecute the military instrument of power in support of national objectives. The joint force commander must “shape” the theater strategic-level protection environment to facilitate the protection operations of the functional components. There is a need to advance the notion of protection from a mind set of active and passive defense to that of a proactive, integrated offense. This is not to imply that active and passive defensive measures will not be part of protection; however, it is intended to move force “protection” from a secondary planning effort into an integrated, simultaneous effort within overall military planning and operations. The coordination, synchronization and execution of all instruments of power to defeat, deter, or disrupt threats within the joint operational environment, are only the beginning. The true force “protection” end-state will be realized when campaign planning and execution encompasses defeating, deterring, and disrupting adversarial and actor threats as a seamless operation throughout the operational environment. The time is now for a serious dialogue on theater strategic-level joint force “protection” for the 21st century.

Endnotes

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⁶ AOR is an acronym for area of responsibility.

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⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 14 November 2000), IV-11.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, III-24.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., III-24 - 25. OPSEC: Operations security; IA: Information assurance; JSAs: Joint security areas; LOCs: Lines of communication; PR: Personnel recovery.

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²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *The United States Army Functional Concept for Protect 2015 – 2024*, 8.

²⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*, 4.

²⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, I-1.

²⁹ Peter Willetts, "Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics", in *Globalization of world politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 2nd ed. By John Baylis (Oxford University Press, 2001), 356.

³⁰ Ibid., 367.

³¹ Thom Shanker, "Leaving NATO, Marine General Still Seeks Troops for Afghanistan", *New York Times*, 21 December 2006, p. 24.

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⁴⁰ Ibid., 642-643.

⁴¹ Thomas L. Friedman, "Dueling Globalizations" *Foreign Policy* #116 (Fall 1999): 115.

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⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "War in the Information Age; In a 24/7 world, the U.S. isn't keeping up with its enemies in the communications battle," *Los Angeles Times* (February 23, 2006): B.13 [database on-line]: available from ProQuest; accessed 17 December 2006.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Colum Lynch, "U.N. Report Sites Outside Military Aid to Somalia's Islamic Forces" *Washington Post*, 15 November 2006, p. sec A, p. 13.

⁴⁹ For a more detailed description of the "joint range of military operations" see the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 September 2006, p. I-12.

⁵⁰ For a more detailed description of the "joint phasing model" see the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, dated 17 September 2006, p. IV-26-27.

⁵¹ For a more detailed description of "planning during execution" see U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, 24 August 2006 (signature draft), p. III-48.

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⁶² U.S. Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2004), 3.

⁶³ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 29.

⁶⁴ Author Unknown, "National Power I: Diplomacy and Information (Public Diplomacy)", briefing slide, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, September 2006. The information contained herein was derived from the referenced brief. I have added, where appropriate, additional "tools" which I believe to be potentially useful. This list should not be construed as tested for acceptability, suitability or feasibility in application.

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